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1 Introduction
It is well known that market failures abound in the real world. A key insight
from the institutional approach to development economics is that capital market
failures prevent individuals and economies from reaching their full potential and
can lead to poverty traps (see Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira
(1993)). In this literature institutional frictions are taken as exogenous.1
It is also well known that even fully accountable governments can fail to im-
plement surplus maximising policies when they lack sufficient instruments for
compensating losers. Furthermore, the political economy approach to develop-
ment has emphasized how concentration of political power in the hands of an
elite, may allow the elites to distort the market outcome in their favour, and this
typically leads to inefficiencies.2
In this paper we highlight the reverse link, namely that market failure may
create a political failure even when political power is uniformly distributed. We
think of political failure as the failure of the electorate to pick surplus maximising
policies.3 In our model, in the first-best world with well functioning markets, the
electorate unanimously chooses institutions that maximise total surplus. However
once a market imperfection in the form of unobservability of entrepreneurial talent
is introduced, things change dramatically. The competitive market responds to
this imperfection by screening agents based on their wealth. This leads to creation
of a class structure in the economy with preferences that are aligned in ways that
defeat surplus maximising reforms.
There is an important distinction between our approach and the existing lit-
erature on political economy. Instead of taking political classes or interest groups
as exogenous and studying the impact of their alignment on markets, we derive
them from economic fundamentals, namely, the nature of technology, and the
informational environment in the economy. 4
We argue that in addition to the well known impacts of market failures studied
in the literature on poverty traps, there may also be a political impact. The
latter problem could turn out to be more persistent since unlike the solutions
1See Banerjee (2001) for a survey of this literature.
2This is most obvious when elites lobby for barriers to entry (Djankov et al. (2002)). Ace-
moglu (2003) makes the argument that concentration of political power may lead to distortion
of the market through manipulation of factor prices in ways that benefit the political elites.
3For a discussion on somewhat different notions of political failure see Besley (2006).
4In this regard, the mechanism that our paper identifies relates to a theme present in both
Marxist and Neo-Classical theories of institutions, namely, economic forces shape the base over
which the political superstructure is built. See chapter 1 in Bardhan (1989) for a review of the
common themes in these literatures concerning the theory of institutions.
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to poverty traps that are easier to characterise5, the solutions to political failure
that are politically feasible may not exist. A more general message emerging
from our model is that the fallout of market and political failures may not be
simply additive since the two may complement each other in generating economic
inefficiencies.
Our paper is related to the growing literature on political economy, that looks
at two questions: first, which institutions increase the size of the pie, and second,
which institutions are more likely to be chosen given a certain distribution of
political power?
Boyer and Laffont (1999) examine which kind of environmental policies will be
implemented under information and distribution constraints when there are po-
litical constraints such as majoritarianism or intervention from special interests,
which shape policy. Perotti and Volpin (2004) develop a model where wealth in-
equality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development.
Rajan and Zingales (2006) show how inequalities in endowments together with
low average levels of endowment can create constituencies that combine to per-
petuate an inefficient status quo against educational reform. Biais and Mariotti
(2009) study how bankruptcy laws affect credit and wages in a general equilibrium
setting. They show how the interests of the rich and the poor may not be aligned
in favour of optimal bankruptcy laws since the rich prefer ones that would lower
equilibrium wages whereas the poor prefer the opposite. Another paper that is
related to ours is Caselli and Gennaioli (2008), who study reforms aimed at dereg-
ulation. Agents differ in talent and whether their endowment includes a license to
run a firm. They show how a mismatch between the two leads to preferences for
deregulation and legal reform. Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2010) show how it
may be efficient to restrict bonded labour clauses in tenancy and debt contracts.
They also derive the political feasibility on the restriction to such clauses and
show how this depends on wealth and the range of collateral instruments that are
available. Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2011) propose a model where unobservability
of the resources invested in reforms and of the ability of incumbent politicians
leads to surplus maximising reforms not being chosen. A recent paper that is
related to ours is Jaimocich and Rud (2011), who construct a general equilibrium
model where unmotivated agents can end up in the bureaucracy, leading to rent
seeking through increasing public sector employment. Although inefficient this
equilibrium may be politically feasible since it leads to an increase in low skilled
5Micro-lending has been a big theme in this literature. See for example Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999).
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wage.
At the root of the inefficiencies showcased in these models discussed above
are the problems in the political domain such as the informational asymmetries
between citizens and political incumbents, rent seeking within the bureaucracy, or
the presence of exogenous political alignments that undermine the support for best
possible institutions. In our model on the other hand the problem in the political
domain is endogenised and the fundamental source of inefficiency lies elsewhere,
in the adverse selection problem in the marketplace created by the unobservability
of entrepreneurial talent. Institutions, depending on their quality, would mitigate
or worsen this problem. Once the adverse selection problem is removed, we find
that the constituencies created in the second-best world also disappear, and the
electorate unanimously favours surplus maximising policies.
Even with a fully benevolent government and perfectly competitive markets,
in our model there are market frictions arising from informational (i.e., adverse
selection) and transactional constraints (limited liability). When the main fric-
tions are political, the focus is typically on reforms to improve the quality of
candidates and/or improve incentives for incumbents and bureaucrats so that in-
efficient rent-extracting policies are removed. In contrast, with market frictions
the policies are far less easy to characterize, and this is especially so if they in-
teract with the political system, even if such system is otherwise frictionless and
the distribution of political power is uniform.
2 Model
The economic fundamentals of the model described below are taken for the most
part from Ghatak et al. (2007), with some modifications, in particular, the intro-
duction of institutional frictions.
2.1 Technology, Preferences, and Endowments
There are two technologies in the economy: a subsistence technology that yields
w with certainty for one unit of labour and a more productive technology that
yields a return R in case of success and 0 in case of failure and requires n workers
and 1 entrepreneur to run it.
All agents are assumed to be risk neutral with a utility function that is addi-
tively separable in effort and money. The disutility of labour effort is M > 0 while
that of entrepreneurial effort is normalized to zero. We can therefore interpret
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M as to include any perks that entrepreneurs enjoy relative to workers such as a
comfortable office, or the psychological payoff from not having a boss.
Agents are endowed with one unit of labour, entrepreneurial talent and illiquid
wealth. The talent of an agent is the probability of success of the more productive
technology if she becomes an entrepreneur. We assume that the distribution
of talent takes only two values. There are a proportion q of high types who
succeed with probability one and a proportion 1 − q of low types who succeed
with probability θ which is less than one.6 Assume that
θ(R− nw) +M > w > θR− nw +M. (1)
This assumption implies that the expected appropriable returns from the project
are not high enough to cover costs when the project is run by a low type en-
trepreneur. Hence in the first-best where talent is observable, only high type
agents will choose entrepreneurship.
Agents are also endowed with illiquid wealth a that is distributed in the pop-
ulation with g(a). As will be clear in section 2.4, wealth is used in the credit
market to screen agents when talent is unobservable.
2.2 Informational and Institutional Frictions
Entrepreneurial ability can be either observable or unobservable. In the first-best
world this talent is observable and the first welfare theorem operates ensuring
that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. In contrast when talent is
unobservable, a market failure arises. The illiquid wealth a, and output, are
verifiable. M is also verifiable but is not appropriable since it is the psychological
net benefit of being an entrepreneur.
The two institutional parameters in the model are φ and τ . The proportion
of collateral that is recovered from a borrower when she defaults is denoted by
φ. This can be thought of as the strength of judicial enforcement of contracts.
The property rights parameter τ , is the probability with which the wealth a is
expropriated. The efficiency of both these institutions affect the credit contract
that an agent is offered in the second-best world as the credit market takes into
account the efficiency of the judiciary and the risk of expropriation when accepting
6Our results apply mutatis mutandis to the case where the high types have talent θH such
that 1 ≥ θH > θ ≥ 0. In an earlier version we also considered a continuous distribution of
talent. The results remain similar to the ones presented here although not as sharp. Note that
this set up implicitly assumes that the distributions of wealth and talent are independent.
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the agent’s wealth as collateral. We discuss this in greater detail in section 3.
In addition to these institutional variables, a limited liability constraint also
operates in the economy. This implies that in the event an entrepreneurial project
fails, the agent can only be liable upto the illiquid asset a. In other words agents
are guaranteed a non negative payoff in all states of the world.
2.3 Occupational Choice
Agents choose their occupation. They can either choose to work in the sub-
sistence sector, become workers, or become entrepreneurs. If they choose en-
trepreneurship, their payoff depends on their type, which is the probability of the
entrepreneurial project being successful. To set up a firm an entrepreneur needs
to hire n workers and pay them a wage w up front, where w ≥ w since working
with the subsistence technology is an outside option that all agents have.
Our assumption that the productive technology requires n workers and 1 en-
trepreneur implies that workers and the entrepreneur are perfect complements
in the production function. This assumption greatly simplifies our analysis and
allows us to get sharp political economy results, although it is not central to our
analysis.
We will present a general equilibrium model with two markets; the labour and
credit market. The need for credit arises as workers need to be paid up front
when an entrepreneurial project is set up and the wealth of agents is illiquid.
Both markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The risk free interest rate
is assumed to be zero.
2.4 Credit Contracts
Since the wealth of an agent is illiquid, agents need to borrow from the credit
market to become entrepreneurs. The credit market is assumed to be perfectly
competitive. The supply of credit is assumed to be perfectly elastic at interest
rate equal to 1.
In the first-best world where talent is observable, given our assumption (1),
only high types would become entrepreneurs. The wage would depend on whether
the economy is talent rich or talent poor (i.e., q1−q ≥ or < 1n ). If talent is abundant
then we get wage w = R+Mn+1 if not then the equilibrium wage is w. This is because
the wage in the first-best is determined by whoever is on the short side of the
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market.7 Since each entrepreneurs requires n workers, the abundance of talent
depends on the proportion of high types in the economy relative to n. This leads
us to the following observation.
Observation 1. When talent is observable only high types choose entrepreneur-
ship. The equilibrium wage is w if
(
q
1−q ≥ 1n
)
and w otherwise.
The second-best world is characterised by the unobservability of entrepreneurial
talent. In all other respects it is identical to the first-best world. Since talent is
unobservable, the credit market can no longer offer contracts that are indexed by
the agent’s talent. However agents are endowed with wealth which they can use
as collateral to access credit. Hence the credit contract will be defined by a pair
(r, a) that is, interest rate and collateral.
We now discuss the possible credit contracts that can be offered to entrepreneurs
and subsequently we characterise the equilibrium in the credit and labour market.
The reader who is only interested in the choice of institutions by the electorate in
the first and second-best world can see the statements of propositions 1 and 2 in
section 2.5 that capture the characterisation of the equilibrium and skip directly
to section 3.
2.4.1 Separating Contract
Let us first consider the separating contracts that can be offered to the agents.
A separating contract exists if the contract is such that agents have an incentive
to reveal their types. Since the probability of success is increasing in type, high
types are offered contracts with lower interest rates. This feature of the credit
contract creates an incentive to lie for low ability agents. Hence for such contracts
to be incentive compatible, agents need to have sufficient wealth that the credit
market can use as a screen. The wealth level below which a separating contract
is not feasible is determined by the constraint
R− rnw ≥ 0
holding with an equality. This is because below this threshold entrepreneurs
earn only M from entrepreneurship which is independent of type. It is therefore
impossible to offer an interest rate and collateral pair that will separate the two
types.
7We require R > nM for the appropriable returns from the project to be large enough to
cover the wage payment when the wage is w.
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Since high types succeed with probability one, the zero profit condition implies
that the separating interest rate rs(a) must be equal to one. We can ignore the
separating contract for low types since it is clear from assumption 1 that this will
not be offered in equilibrium.
2.4.2 Pooling and Semi-Separating Contracts
In addition to a separating contract, there may also exist pooling and semi-
separating contracts in this economy. Unlike the separating contract that is only
available when R ≥ rnw, a pooling contract is possible even if this constraint is
violated.
Let us first consider the region of wealth such that R ≥ rp(a)nw. Any pool-
ing or semi-separating contract that could be offered must satisfy the necessary
condition of zero profit for competitive banks:
rp(a)θp(a)nw + (1− θp(a))(1− τ)φa = nw (2)
where
θp(a) =
q + θ(1− q)λ(a)
q + (1− q)λ(a)
is the average talent in the pool of entrepreneurs at wealth level a. The function
λ(a) is the probability with which low types with wealth a choose entrepreneur-
ship. In a pooling contract λ(a) = 1 whereas in a semi-separating contract
0 < λ(a) < 1. Note that the formulation of the optimal contract implicitly
assumes that all wealth is seized when the agent defaults. It is easy to see that
the equilibrium contract will take this form since this is the preferred contract for
the high type. High types succeed with a higher probability and hence, relative to
less talented agents, prefer contracts that are tougher in the bad state and yield
a high payoff in the good state.
Now let us consider the zero profit condition for banks when R < rp(a)nw for
rp(a) as defined in equation (2). In this region, in addition to the project returns
R, the banks also need to be pledged a proportion of collateral for them to break
even. The zero profit contract is now defined by
θp(a)(R+ (1− γ(a))(1− τ)φa) + (1− θp(a))(1− τ)φa = nw. (3)
where (1 − γ(a)) is the proportion of collateral that is taken over by the bank
in case the project succeeds. Hence the contract in this region is defined by the
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pair (γ(a), a). It is important to note that entrepreneurship is attractive not just
because of the appropriable return R but also for the non-appropriable return M .
If the latter is large enough, agents would be willing to choose entrepreneurship
in exchange for their wealth even in the case when the project succeeds. Indeed a
necessary condition for the existence of credit constraints in this model is M > w.
Note that γ(a) is increasing in a since banks would have to appropriate a larger
share of wealth in the good state to satisfy the zero profit condition when the
agent has lower wealth.
Rewriting (3), credit contracts can only be offered when
θp(a)R+ (1− τ)φa ≥ nw.
This condition only holds when agents have sufficient wealth. This in turn defines
the wealth level a, such that agents with wealth less than this threshold will not
be offered a pooling or semi-separating contract. Note that at this wealth level
γ(a) = 0 must hold since agents would have to forgo their entire wealth in order
to secure the credit contract.
a =
nw − θp(a)R
φ(1− τ) . (4)
2.5 Equilibrium
In the previous subsection we have discussed the types of credit contracts that
can exist in the economy. We are now ready to characterise the equilibrium.
2.5.1 Equilibrium in the Credit Market
We have shown that pooling, semi-separating and separating contracts are viable.
Given that banks can introduce any contract (r(a), a) we will now characterise the
equilibrium in the model. We will use the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) equilib-
rium concept that is standard in this literature. An equilibrium is characterised
by the following two conditions: i) all the contracts in the equilibrium set make
non negative profits and ii) there does not exist a contract that can be introduced
that will make a strictly positive profit. We will assume that M > w which in
turn implies that a > 0 (otherwise, low type agents will not be tempted to be an
entrepreneur).
To begin with, note that a separating contract is only viable when agents have
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sufficient wealth. We define this wealth level as
a =
nw
(1− τ)φ. (5)
Lemma 2 in the appendix shows that a separating contract is not viable for agents
with wealth less than a. This is because wealth is the only instrument here that
the credit market can use to screen agents and there is a threshold of wealth below
which this is not possible.
For agents with wealth less than a a semi-separating contracts will exist in
equilibrium. To see this it is convenient to define vL(a, rp(a), w) here as the left
hand side of the following occupational choice constraint:
θ(R− rp(a)nw)− (1− τ)(1− θ)a+M = w. (6)
Whenever a low type agent with wealth a makes a wage payments at the wage rate
w, is offered a credit contract with interest rate rp(a), the net value he receives
from entrepreneurship is vL(a, rp(a), w). If this makes him indifferent to working
for a wage, the following condition holds:
vL(a, rp(a), w) = w. (7)
When a low type is indifferent he randomises with probability λ(a) between en-
trepreneurship and working for a wage. Lemma 1 shows that this probability is
uniquely determined in equilibrium and is decreasing in wealth. At a it is easy to
check that rp(a) = 1 since λ = 0 as all low types have dropped out. As we move to
wealth a < a entrepreneurship becomes attractive for low types. As low types be-
come entrepreneurs this raises the interest rate and decreases vL(a, rp(a), w) and
this ensures vL(a, rp(a), w) = w continues to hold. This is where λ ∈ (0, 1) and
the equilibrium contract is semi-separating. As we move lower down the wealth
distribution there may come a point where λ = 1. This is where a pooling con-
tract may exist. Hence in equilibrium separating and semi-separating contracts
must exist whereas a pooling contract may or may not exist. The existence of a
pooling contract depends on whether at
a(λ = 1) =
nw −R(q + (1− q)θ)
(1− τ)φ (8)
vL(a(λ = 1), rp(a(λ = 1)), w) ≥ w. That is, whether or not the low types find
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it attractive to become entrepreneurs at this level of wealth. This is shown in
Lemma 3. We are ready to characterise the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Occupational Choice). Agents with wealth a where:
• a > a are credit constrained and hence become workers.
• a > a ≥ a and high talent become entrepreneurs. Agents with low talent
randomise and choose entrepreneurship with probability λ(a).
• a ≥ a and high talent become entrepreneurs and the rest become workers.
Proof: In the appendix.
2.5.2 Equilibrium in the Labour Market
The labour market is perfectly competitive. An equilibrium is characterised by
the market clearing condition. It is much easier to characterise the equilibrium
by thinking of the labour demand of a firm instead of the labour demand by
an entrepreneur. A firm demands 1 unit of entrepreneurial and n units of non
entrepreneurial labour. Supply is 0 for wage w < w, and 1 at w ≥ w.
Proposition 2. A unique wage w ∈ [w,w] exists.
Proof: In the appendix.8
Note that whenever w > w, this implies that the economy is tight in the
sense that there is no subsistence sector. Workers are on the short side of the
market and the wage must rise to equilibrate the demand and supply of workers.
The number of entrepreneurs in such an economy is 1n+1 . Whenever the wage
increases, the proportion of entrepreneurs in the economy must stay constant
at 1n+1 . Although the wage increase does not affect the relative proportions of
the population engaged in the two sectors, it does affect the composition. In
particular, the increase in wage will affect the average quality of the pool of
entrepreneurs in the economy.
3 Credit Market Institutions
Now we turn to the parameters that capture institutional frictions, namely, φ an
τ . The parameter τ captures the security of property rights. A high τ implies
8In contrast with Ghatak et al. (2007) there are no multiple equilibria here since firm level
labour demand is constant at n. This implies that the intensive margin effect is absent and the
labour demand is driven solely by the extensive margin effect.
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that law enforcement is poor and assets are likely to be stolen by thieves or taken
over by the local strongman. Hence a straightforward way to think about τ is how
tough government is on property related crime and how well it enforces the claims
of someone dispossessed of their property. Alternatively, τ can also be thought of
as how well the titling system works. To the extent it is easy to bribe the local
bureaucrat to get the name on someone’s land title changed, τ would be high and
vice versa.
The parameter φ measures the efficiency of contractual institutions. The treat-
ment of φ is somewhat different since it is the proportion of collateralized wealth
that can be liquidated. If an agent pledges wealth a as collateral to become an
entrepreneur, and his project fails, the bank only recovers φa. Hence (1− φ)a is
pure inefficiency and consequently there is a strong case for thinking that φ = 1
will be the surplus maximising policy. However under certain conditions, this
effect may be dominated through the inefficiencies caused in the occupational
choices since a high φ can end up making entrepreneurship attractive to agents
who should optimally become workers.
The parameters φ and τ capture different aspects of institutional frictions that
reduce the efficiency of market transactions involving wealth.9 The distinction
between the two institutions relates to the two key aspects of property rights,
namely, use rights and exchange rights.10 However, in most applications one can
think of, φ and τ would interact together creating aggregate transaction costs
that would dampen the incentives for market transactions involving wealth. For
example in the model presented here, both enter multiplicatively when agents
post their wealth as collateral to become entrepreneurs. The credit market takes
into account both the insecurity of the property right over the collateral and the
costs of enforcing the credit contract in case of default.
9We have focused only on institutional frictions involving wealth because wealth is the in-
strument that banks can use to mitigate the inefficiencies due to the unobservability of talent,
and we want to show that the political process can fail to choose the right reforms even when
there is no redistributive objective.
10In Besley (1995) three channels through which property rights affects investment incentives
are laid out. These are the security of tenure, the use of property as collateral, and the benefits
of gains from trade (e.g., rental). Of these the first one is the channel through which τ would
affect investment incentives whereas the second one is the channel through which φ would work.
The third channel relating to the use of land as collateral is affected by an interaction of τ and
φ. Of course wealth in our model is exogenous and therefore the issue of investment incentives
does not arise.
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3.1 Institutions in the first-best World
We now show that in the first-best world the surplus maximising institutions are
chosen.
Proposition 3. When talent is observable, voters unanimously choose surplus
maximising institutions, namely, τ = 0 and φ = 1.
Proof. Total surplus in the economy is maximized when the most talented agents
become entrepreneurs regardless of their wealth. This is equivalent to the quality
of the pool of entrepreneurs being maximised. Under the first best the total
surplus in the economy is:
Wfb = q(R+M)+
∞∫
0
(1−τ)ag(a)d(a)+1[q(n+1)<1]w(1−q(n+1))+(1−τ)
∫ ∞
0
ag(a)da
(9)
Note that 1[q(n+1)<1] is an indicator function that is switched on whenever
there’s a subsistence sector in the economy. This happens whenever the economy
is talent poor, that is q < 1n+1 .
By inspecting this expression it is clear that the total surplus is decreasing in
τ . Hence τ = 0 is surplus maximising. Since all agents lose a part of their wealth
as τ increases, it is at least weakly dominant for all agents to vote for τ = 0 and
this is unanimously chosen. Since φ does not appear in (9), all values of φ are
surplus maximising, and hence the proposition is trivially true for φ.
When talent is observable, the preferences of the electorate are unanimously
aligned with surplus maximisation. Hence a τ = 0 is chosen because better prop-
erty rights increase the expected payoff of all agents. Similarly the optimal φ
would be chosen to the extent there are any contractual transactions involving
wealth. Note that in the first-best in our model there are no contractual transac-
tions involving wealth since talent is observable and wealth has no use as a screen.
Hence all values of φ are optimal in the first-best world.
3.2 Institutions in the second-best World
In the last subsection we showed that in the first-best world the preferences of
the electorate are unanimously aligned with surplus maximisation. We will show
that as soon as there’s a departure from the first-best, the inefficiency of the
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market gets further amplified by the choices of the electorate that is created in
the inefficient market. In the second-best world with unobservable talent, the
total surplus is:
Wsb = (R+M)q(1−G(a)) + (θR+M)(1− q)
∫ a
a
λ(a)g(a)da (10)
1[
(n+1)
∫∞
a
q+(1−q)λ(a)g(a)da<1
]w
(
1− (n+ 1)
∫ ∞
a
(
q + (1− q)λ(a)
)
g(a)da
)
+(1− τ)
∫ ∞
0
ag(a)da
−(1− τ)(1− φ)
a∫
a
(
(1− γ(a))(q + (1− q)θλ(a) + (1− q)(1− θ)λ(a)
)
ag(a)da.
Note that 1[
(n+1)
∫∞
a
q+(1−q)λ(a)g(a)da<1
] is an indicator function that is switched
on when there’s a subsistence sector in the economy. This happens when the mass
of entrepreneurs is insufficient to soak up all the workers in the economy, that is∫∞
a
q + (1− q)λ(a)g(a)da < 1n+1 .
In this economy there are two productive activities, the subsistence sector
where a worker produces w, and the modern sector where n workers and 1 en-
trepreneur generate a surplus R + M if the entrepreneur has high ability and
θR + M if the entrepreneur has low ability. The wage paid to the worker in the
modern sector is simply a transfer from the entrepreneur to the worker which
doesn’t enter the total surplus. In the world of full information, the first-best
is guaranteed, where all high types become entrepreneurs and the rest become
workers. It is possible that there is a subsistence sector in the first-best world if
the economy is talent poor. This is what the indicator function in equation (9)
captures.
We have a model where individuals differ in talent and wealth, the former being
unobservable and the latter being observable. There is adverse selection in talent,
which is the source of the market friction in our model. The other dimension of
heterogeneity which generates the class structure, is provided by wealth, which is
observable and can be used as collateral but has no other productive use. However
in our setting the two institutional frictions that we study, both have to do with
impediments to hold on to or to transfer wealth. As expected, very poor agents are
credit constrained independent of talent and have to be workers. Also, rich agents
can post enough collateral so that the adverse selection problem is solved and so
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only those with talent above a certain level choose to be entrepreneurs. For agents
with moderate levels of wealth, there isn’t enough collateral to solve the adverse
selection problem and so pooling contracts are offered such that low talent agents
might become entrepreneurs, which would not be the case if they were either very
rich or very poor. As a result we have both types of distortions: talented agents
who become workers because they are poor, and non-talented agents who become
entrepreneurs because they have some moderate level of wealth. Any change in
a will affect the former and any change in λ(a) will affect the latter. We state
this formally in the following lemma .
Lemma 4. A policy that decreases a or λ(a) increases total surplus.
Proof. First consider a policy that decreases a. This will increase the access to
entrepreneurship. There are two possible scenarios. First, the wage stays constant
at w as a result of the change. In this case note that agents who do not change
their occupation remain unaffected since wage or the credit contract they receive
remains unchanged. The low and high type agents who switch from being workers
to being entrepreneurs as a result of being unconstrained must be better off by
revealed preference since the wage stays unchanged. Second, the wage increases
as a result of increased labour demand. Note that the proportion of entrepreneurs
in the population must stay constant at 1n+1 for wage to increase. In this case
since high types who were previously entrepreneurs remain so, the change in
composition of entrepreneurs must come from rich low types who are replaced
by poor high and low types who were previously constrained. Consequently the
increase in the proportion of high types in the pool of entrepreneurs increases the
average quality of entrepreneurs in the economy thereby increasing total surplus.
Second, consider a policy that decreases λ(a). This reduces the number of
low type entrepreneurs. It is clear by assumption made in equation (1) that this
increases total surplus.
The first-best can be replicated in the world with incomplete information if all
agents have sufficient wealth and can be offered a separating contract. Therefore
if the average wealth in this economy is greater than the threshold level of wealth
required for separation, a policy of redistribution can restore full efficiency in
this economy. If the total level of wealth is insufficient or if the instruments
for carrying out such a redistribution are unavailable, then there will always be
some inefficiency, since there would be low types who choose entrepreneurship.
Moreover when a credit constraint exists, there would also be high types that are
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forced to work for a wage. To discuss whether endogenous institutions can bring
the economy in the direction of higher welfare or not, suppose that all agents can
vote in a binary election between a status quo institution (status quo φ or τ) and
an alternative. When faced with a binary choice, each agent votes sincerely.11
The cornerstone to understanding why agents choose non surplus maximising
institutions is the following: in this economy there are always at least nn+1 work-
ers. Since n ≥ 1, a policy that increases wage has support of at least half the
population. However policies that increase the wage may not decrease the credit
constraint a and the rich low type entrepreneurs λ(a). As shown in Lemma 4, this
would be at odds with surplus maximisation. This is the insight that we will use
to generate the results in the rest of this section. Thus efficient institutions are
those that decrease the credit constraint and the mass of low type entrepreneurs,
and consequently increase the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs whereas insti-
tutions that increase wage are politically feasible. This is in sharp contrast to the
first-best world without market failure where the choice of institutional reform
does not affect wage and consequently institutions are chosen optimally.
3.2.1 Support for improvement in judicial enforcement
The parameter φ in the model denotes the amount of collateral that banks can
liquidate in case of default and is the parameter that denotes the quality of the
judiciary.12 Given the discussion on efficiency and political feasibility, we are
ready to state the following proposition.
Proposition 4. A policy of improving contractual institutions is always politically
feasible but may not be surplus maximising.
Proof. An improvement in contractual institutions is captured by an increase of
φ. We will first prove that a policy of increasing φ is guaranteed majority support.
11One could argue that an alternative policy that is aimed at maximising total surplus may
not win when put to majority vote. This result in itself is not particularly surprising. Since
redistributive instruments are lacking it is to be expected that agents inefficiently use institutions
to redistribute rather than to maximise surplus. Indeed such a choice of institutions is not
inefficient in the Paretian sense. What is interesting here however is that the alignment of
interest groups is itself created by the existence of market failure and this alignment takes the
economy away even from the second-best world with market failures.
12Alternatively, the quality of the judiciary could be modelled as a combination of fixed and
variable costs that need to be paid for seeking liquidation. In such a model the credit constraint
would instead be determined by the zero profit condition θp(a)(R+(1−τ)φa−f)+(1−θp)((1−
τ)φa− f) = nw where f is the additional fixed cost. Adopting this formulation does not affect
our results.
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To see this note that the labour demand is weakly increasing in φ
∂LD
∂φ
= (1 + n)
(
−g(a)∂a
∂φ
(q + (1− q)λ(a)) + (1− q)
∫ a
a
∂λ(a)
∂φ
g(a)da
)
> 0
(11)
It is easy to see from equation (4) that the credit constraint is decreasing in φ.
To see that ∂λ(a)∂φ > 0 note that
∂vL(a, rp(a), w)
∂φ
=
∂vL(a, rp(a), w)
∂rp(a)
∂rp(a)
∂φ
> 0. (12)
Since φ makes entrepreneurship more attractive by decreasing the interest rate
λ(a) must decrease to keep vL(a, rp(a), w) = w satisfied. This shows that labour
demand is increasing in φ. The wage is non decreasing in labour demand and
hence ∂w∂φ ≥ 0 must be true. Workers that comprise at least one half of the
population support this policy. Furthermore a positive measure of low types who
are currently entrepreneurs in the semi-separating region also support this, since
they switch to higher payoff as worker as a consequence of the policy. Hence it is
guaranteed majority support.
We now show that the effect of an increase in φ on total surplus is ambiguous.
Note that there are two conflicting effect of an increase in φ on total surplus:
∂a
∂φ
< 0 but
∂λ(a)
∂φ
> 0. (13)
Lemma 4 shows how ∂a∂φ < 0 increases total surplus but
∂λ(a)
∂φ decreases it. The net
effect depends on which of the two dominates and is consequently ambiguous.
We have shown that the equilibrium wage is non decreasing in φ, and hence
the proposal for increasing φ is supported by the majority. However, total surplus
may not be increasing in φ since the effect of an increase in φ on the quality of
the pool of entrepreneurs is ambiguous.
To understand why φ = 1 may not be optimal note that if the credit constraint
worsens as a result of an increase in φ then the total surplus must decrease. Credit
constraints can worsen if the effect of φ on the increase in the equilibrium wage
through an increase in λ(a) overwhelms the effect on a. In this case the proportion
of entrepreneurs in the population must stay constant at 1n+1 for the wage to have
increased even though the credit constraint has worsened. If the credit constraint
worsens there would be a positive measure of previously unconstrained high types
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who would now be forced out of entrepreneurship. Since they must be replaced
by rich low types due to an increase in λ(a), the average quality of the pool of
entrepreneurs must decrease. If this effect on total surplus is larger than the
positive effect of easier collateralisability through an increase in φ, total surplus
must decrease. In short when φ increases it is possible that rich low types who were
previously workers are attracted to entrepreneurship. This can in turn increase
the wage and crowd out some high types due to an increase in the credit constraint
and this has a negative effect on total surplus. If this negative effect dominates
the positive effect through easier liquidation of collateral in case of failure, the
net effect on total surplus is negative.
This result is quite striking when contrasted against the standard intuition
about contracting institutions. Here improving the quality of contracting institu-
tions (increasing φ) is not always good since that makes entrepreneurship more
attractive and this induces low types to become entrepreneurs. This result arises
because there are inherent externalities when agents borrow money: the low type
entrepreneurs by their very existence impose an externality on the high types.
3.2.2 Support for Improvement in Property Rights
Imperfect protection of property rights reduces the value of wealth. This in turn
makes entrepreneurship more attractive since agents do not place as much weight
on default and consequent loss of collateral. We show that the political support
for a change in τ is ambiguous because the effect on the wage is ambiguous.
Proposition 5. A policy of improving property rights institutions is always sur-
plus maximising but may not be politically feasible.
Proof. An improvement in property rights institutions is captured by a decrease
in τ . We will first prove that the effect on a decrease in τ on wage is ambiguous
and hence it may not enjoy majority support.
∂LD
∂τ
= (1 + n)
(
−g(a)∂a
∂τ
(q + (1− q)λ(a)) + (1− q)
∫ a
a
∂λ(a)
∂τ
g(a)da
)
(14)
The sign of this expression is indeterminate since it depends on the relative mag-
nitude of ∂a∂τ > 0 and
∂λ(a)
∂τ > 0. It is easy to check that
∂a
∂τ > 0. To see that
∂λ(a)
∂τ > 0, note that due to risk neutrality an increase in τ effectively works
as a reduction in the expected wealth of an agent. Equation (25) in lemma 1
shows that
∂vL(a,rp(a),w)
∂a < 0. As a result it must be true that
∂λ(a)
∂τ > 0 to keep
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vL(a, rp(a), w) = w satisfied. This implies the effect of a decrease in τ on the
labour demand and consequently on the wage is ambiguous. Hence a policy of
reducing τ may not be supported by the majority. This will be true when the
median voter is poor enough to care primarily about the effect of τ on the wage.
To see that decreasing τ is surplus maximising note that τ affects total surplus
in two ways
∂a
∂τ
> 0 and
∂λ(a)
∂τ
> 0. (15)
Lemma 4 shows how both these effects go towards reducing total surplus. Hence
it is unambiguously surplus maximising to decrease τ .
Credit constraints are increasing in τ . When τ increases, the effective wealth
of an agent decreases, and the interest rate at all levels of wealth increases. This
is intuitive since an increase in τ decreases the value of wealth as a screen. Since
agents are likely to have their wealth expropriated anyway, posting a high col-
lateral is less effective in revealing an agent’s type. Take the limiting case where
τ goes close to one. In this case the credit market correctly anticipates that all
agents are equally eager to post any collateral since they know that their wealth
will be expropriated and hence don’t attach any value on recovery of collateral in
the event of success and consequent repayment of the loan.
There are two opposing effects on wage of a decrease in τ . Firstly decreasing τ
reduces the level of credit constraint. This increases the number of entrepreneurs.
Decreasing τ also decreases the attractiveness of entrepreneurship for marginal
agents who are in the region where the semi-separating contract operates that is
where vL(a, rp(a), w) = w. As a result of this, λ(a) drops, decreasing the number
of entrepreneurs. The political feasibility of decreasing τ depends on which of the
two effect dominates. However the effect on total surplus is unambiguous since
decreasing τ allows more high types to become entrepreneurs and disincentives
some low types from entrepreneurship.
Propositions 4 and 5 seen together bring into sharp relief the trade-off be-
tween political feasibility and efficiency of institutional reform. Only reforms that
increase wages are politically feasible but these may not correspond to reforms
that are surplus maximising. While contractual institutions are politically feasi-
ble they may not be surplus maximising. On the other hand reform of property
rights which is always surplus maximising may not be politically feasible.
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4 Introducing More Policies
In this section we expand the set of policies that the electorate can vote on. This
allows us to examine whether an increased set of fiscal instruments allows the
electorate to escape the negative results derived in Proposition 5. In particular
we allow the electorate a choice of the efficient value of τ coupled with a subsidy
to workers financed through a tax on entrepreneurs. We show that such a bundle
may not always be feasible and that the electorate could end up being stuck with
an inefficient τ .
4.1 Talent Rich Economy
Consider a status quo with τ > 0 that is supported by a majority when the option
of voting on entrepreneurial tax t along with wage subsidy s was not available.
We want to see if it is possible to induce the electorate to vote in favour of τ = 0
by introducing a more efficient channel of compensation for the workers.
The following proposition shows that when q > 1n+1 , then a s exists such that
agents vote for τ = 0.
Proposition 6. In a talent-rich economy, a welfare maximising, budget balanced
t and s exists that would increase total surplus and would at the same time be
supported by the majority.
Proof. Consider a subsidy that makes a high type entrepreneur with an arbitrary
wealth level indifferent between working for a wage and being an entrepreneur at
interest rate 1:
vH(a, 1, w)− t = w + s (16)
Note that vH is independent of wealth and vH(0, 1, w) > vL(0, 1, w):
R− nw +M − t = w + s > θ(R− nw) +M − t. (17)
Since the attractiveness of entrepreneurship is decreasing in wealth for low types,
it must be the case that all low types prefer working for a wage.
Consider the political economy problem. Denote the wage in status quo as wˆ.
Note that all workers strictly prefer this policy to status quo since their payoff is
w + s = w > wˆ. Since a fraction n/(n + 1) are workers, and n ≥ 1, the policy
is guaranteed a majority support. In the status quo there is a positive measure
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of agents who are credit constrained. Hence there must be atleast one high type
agent who was previously credit constrained and worked for a wage and is an
entrepreneur as a result of the policy intervention. This agent prefers the policy
to status quo since his payoff after the intervention is vH(1, w) = w > wˆ. Hence
the policy is favoured by more than 50% of the population.
To see that this policy is budget balanced, note that in this economy there are
n workers for each entrepreneurs. Hence t = ns ensures budget balance.
This condition guarantees that high types are indifferent between entrepreneur-
ship and working for a wage. Note that since the high wage equilibrium is defined
as w = vH(1, w), in this case it can be checked that w + s = w.
4.2 Talent Poor Economy
Recall that in a talent poor economy, with ( q1−q <
1
n ), the wage is w in the first-
best. This is because only high types find it profitable to become entrepreneurs
at the actuarially fair interest rate. Since the number of high type agents is
small relative to n, not all agents work in the hi-tech sector, and consequently a
subsistence sector exists. In the second-best world however, wage can be greater
than w due to the possibility of low type agents in the pool of entrepreneurs.
We will now show that it is possible for a suboptimal value of τ to be chosen
even when there are other instruments present in the economy that could be put
to redistributive ends by the electorate. To show this we construct an example of
an economy where a vote on decreasing τ is defeated.
Assume there are two wealth classes, the rich with wealth a and the poor
with wealth zero. Let the proportion of the rich be α > 1n+1 and assume that
a > M − w. This ensures that when τ = 0 rich low types prefer to be workers.
Assume that qR < nw which ensures that the poor are always credit constrained.
To simplify things further assume that low types possess no entrepreneurial talent,
that is θ = 0 and that the contractual institutions are perfect, that is φ = 1.
M ≥ w ≥M − nw. (18)
With the status quo τ > 0 let us assume that rich low types prefer entrepreneur-
ship. The interest rate at this wealth level will be define by the zero profit condi-
tion for the banks:
q
q + (1− q)λrp(a)nw +
(1− q)λ
q + (1− q)λ (1− τ)a = nw. (19)
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Since the rich low types prefer entrepreneurship, in equilibrium the wage must
rise to keep the low types indifferent. Hence for the appropriate λ to arise the
following must hold:
M − (1− τ)a = w. (20)
Now consider a proposal for improving property rights to τ = 0 through a
budget balanced tax on entrepreneurs and subsidy to workers. Budget balance
implies αqt ≥ (1 − αq)s. For workers to be indifferent to a policy that reduces
their wage, the subsidy they receive must be high enough to offset the loss in their
income. That is s ≥ w − w. Similarly the tax on entrepreneurs cannot exceed
the increase in surplus they experience as a result of a decrease in τ . Hence
R − nw + M + a ≥ R − rp(a)nw + M + (1 − τ)a. Using these conditions along
with budget balance we have
αq
(
nw(q + (1− q)λ)
q
− a(1− τ)(1− q)λ
q
+ τa− nw
)
≥ (1−αq)n(w−w). (21)
Proposition 7. When n is large enough it is impossible to construct a budget
balanced tax and subsidy package that will enable the improvement of property
rights institutions.
Proof: In the appendix.
This result demonstrates that it is not possible to always avoid a choice of
inefficient institution by constructing a budget balanced package of wage subsidy
and entrepreneurial tax. The reason for this is that part of the efficiency gains
from a reduction in τ go to rich low types who were previously entrepreneurs.
Since these agents switch their occupation in response to a decrease in τ they are
not subject to the entrepreneurial tax. The revenues generated from t come only
from rich high types since they continue to be entrepreneurs.
This proposition acts as a robustness check to our results. It shows that a
simple package of tax and subsidy that is conditioned on occupational choices is
insufficient to avoid the inefficiency of proposition 5. To get around our inefficiency
results the state would need a richer set of instruments. In particular it would
need the capacity to condition its policies on not only the occupational choice but
also the wealth level of an agent.
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5 Conclusion
To summarise our result on institutional efficiency and feasibility, we find that
improving contractual institutions is always feasible but may not always be ef-
ficient, since improving contracting induces too many low type agents to choose
entrepreneurship. On the other hand, we find that improving property right pro-
tection institutions increase total surplus but may not always be politically fea-
sible. These results are consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who find
that property rights institutions have a strong positive impact on the economic
outcomes whereas the impact of contractual institutions is less obvious. Moreover
our result show why even when the welfare properties of these institutions are well
known we may not expect the best policies to be chosen.
When there’s a market failure, the competitive equilibrium is no longer guar-
anteed to be on the Pareto frontier. Our model makes the point that in the event
of a market failure, competitive markets can passively play a political role of cre-
ating constituencies. These constituencies can have a preference for inefficient
policies. This leads to the inefficiencies of market failure being further amplified
by the policy choices that constituencies created in a flawed market make. In
this sense our paper provides an additional reason to worry about market fail-
ure; market failure may lead to a political failure even in a fully representative
democracy.
Finally, the last two propositions of the paper highlight the possibility that
the feedback effects we uncover between market and political failures generate a
kind of “poverty trap”, in the sense that it is only in talent rich economies that
the introduction of transfers or bundling of policies can eliminate the possibility
of a democratic endogenous choice of bad property right protection laws.
Appendix
Lemma 1.
∂λ(a)
∂a
≤ 0 (22)
Proof. λ(a) is jointly determined by the zero profit condition for the banks(
q + (1− q)θλ(a)
q + (1− q)λ(a)
)
rp(a)nw +
(
(1− q)(1− θ)λ(a)
q + (1− q)λ(a)
)
φ(1− τ)a = nw. (23)
and the occupational choice condition for low types. In particular λ(a) = 1 when
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vL(a, rp(a), w) > w since low types strictly prefer entrepreneurship, λ(a) = 0 for
vL(a, rp(a), w) < w since low types strictly prefer working for a wage. In these
regions ∂λ(a)∂a = 0. Lastly λ(a) ∈ [0, 1] when vL(a, rp(a), w) = w since low types
randomise when indifferent. In this region substituting the interest rate rp(a)
using equation (23) into vL(a, rp(a), w) we find
vL(a, rp(a), w) = θR− q + (1− q)λ
q + (1− q)θλnw−(1−τ)(1−θ)a
(
1− (1− q)λφ
q + (1− q)θλ
)
+M
(24)
This allows us to check that
∂vL(a, rp(a), w)
∂a
< 0 (25)
Finally since
∂vL(a, rp(a), w)
∂λ
=
∂vL(a, rp(a), w)
∂rp(a)
∂rp(a)
∂λ
< 0 (26)
λ must decrease as wealth increases for vL(a, rp(a), w) = w such that an equilib-
rium can exist.
Lemma 2. Only agents with wealth a ≥ a are offered a separating contract and
this contract is defined by the collateral - interest rate pair (a, 1).
Proof. First note that ais the collateral requirement such that low types with this
wealth are unwilling to become entrepreneurs even at interest rate of one. Hence
high types can be offered the contract (a, 1) and this will make zero profits. To
see that this is unique assume a contract (a, r′) exists that dominates (a, 1).For
this to be true r′ < 1 must be true since at a given wealth level the contract with
the lowest interest rate dominates. The bank that offers this contract makes
losses since the opportunity cost of capital is 1, and hence, this contract will not
be offered. But this is a contradiction. This proves that the separating contract
(a, 1) is viable and unique for wealth a ≥ a.
We will now argue that separating contracts are dominated for wealth a < a
and will therefore not exist in equilibrium. To see this note that at wealth a
the contract (rp(a), a) makes use of the entire wealth as collateral. A separating
contract (r′, a) for r′ < rp(a) will make losses since rp(a) is already a zero profit
interest rate. A separating contract (r′, a) for r′ > rp(a) will be dominated
by the contract (rp(a), a). This rules out a separating contract with collateral
requirement a. Finally a separating contract with a collateral requirement a′ < a
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for agent with wealth a will not be incentive compatible since for any interest rate
it would be more attractive for low types if it is attractive for high types. Hence
no separation is possible for wealth a < a.
Proof for Proposition 1. Note that a > a since
nw
(1− τ)φ >
nw − θpR
(1− τ)φ . (27)
The rest of the proof follows from lemma 1, and 2.
Lemma 3. A pooling contract exists if and only if vL(a(λ = 1), rp(a(λ = 1)), w) ≥
w
Proof. If vL(a(λ = 1), rp(a(λ = 1)), w) > w then low types prefer entrepreneur-
ship with a pooling contract. Since a(λ = 1) is defined in a way that ensures
banks break even with a pooling contract, this contract is viable. Banks can-
not offer a semi-separating contract here since it is not incentive compatible as
vL(a(λ = 1), rp(a(λ = 1), w) > w.
Now we show that if a pooling contract exists in equilibrium it must be the
case that vL(a(λ = 1), rp(a(λ = 1)), w) > w. To see this let us consider whether
∃a′ 6= a(λ = 1) such that a pooling contract is feasible for banks and attractive
for agents. First note that a′ < a is not feasible for banks since this would
imply negative profits. Next note that
∂vL(a,rp(a),w)
∂a < 0. This implies that if
vL(a(λ = 1), rp(a(λ = 1)), w) < w then vL(a
′, rp(a), w) < w must also be true.
Hence a pooling contract will not exist in equilibrium.
The condition on parameters that corresponds to vL(a(λ = 1), rp(a(λ =
1)), w) ≥ w is
R(q + (1− q)θ)− nw + φM ≥ w (28)
Proof for Proposition 2. The Labour Markets are assumed to be perfectly com-
petitive. Labour Supply is 0 for wage lower than w and 1 for any wage w ≥ w.
Labour demand is given by:
(1 + n)
q(1−G(a)) + (1− q) a∫
a
λ(a)g(a)da
 (29)
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First we will see that the labour demand is monotonically decreasing in the wage.
∂LD
∂w
= (1 + n)
(
−g(a) ∂a
∂w
(q + (1− q)λ(a)) + (1− q)
∫ a
a
∂λ(a)
∂w
g(a)da
)
< 0
(30)
This is true since
∂a
∂w
< 0 and
∂λ(a)
∂w
< 0. (31)
This implies that there’s a unique w ≥ w that clears the market. Wage w is
bounded from above by w = R+Mn+1 since even high types would exit entrepreneur-
ship if wages rise above this. If w = w then high types must randomise between
entrepreneurship and working for a wage with probability p =
1
q(n+ 1)
.
This is true because w = w implies that q ≥ 1n+1 . To see this note 2 things:
1. Define vH(1, w) as the value from entrepreneurship that a high type agent
gets when the interest rate the bank charges him is 1. It is easy to see that this
is independent of his wealth. By definition: w = vH(1, w). Since vH(1, w) >
vL(1, w), w > vL(1, w). This implies that in an economy where the wage is w
there are no low type entrepreneurs.
2. Note that when w > w none of the agents are engaged in the subsistence
sector and hence 1n+1 are entrepreneurs This is true because in this economy the
capacity for entrepreneurship is limited by the size of the population due to the
perfect complements production function. When none of the agents are engaged
in the subsistence sector (w > w), only 1n+1 will be entrepreneurs and
n
n+1 will
be workers (the population is normalised to 1).
1 and 2 imply that q ≥ 1n+1 . If high types randomise and become entrepreneurs
with probability p, since the number of agent in the economy is infinite, by law of
large numbers, there will be pq entrepreneurs and (1−p)q+(1−q) workers in the
economy. It is easy to see that this yeilds 1n+1 entrepreneurs and
n
n+1 workers.
Hence a unique w ∈ [w,w] exists that clears the market.
Proof of Proposition 7. Simplifying equation (21) we have
αqa ≥ (w − w)(1− αq(n+ 1)) + α(M − w)(q + (1− q)λ)− α(1− q)λnw (32)
Since we are concerned with a talent poor economy with q < 1n+1 , we can rewrite
q = βn+1 , where β ∈ (0, 1). Similarly we can rewrite α = An+1 for A > 1.
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Substituting this into equation (32) we have
βa+(1−β)M ≥ (w−w) 1
A
(
1 +
1
n
)
(n+1−Aβ)+a(1− τ)
(
1
n
+ 1− β
)
. (33)
It is possible to see that the first term on the right hand side is unbounded in n
whereas the rest of the equation converges to a constant as n → ∞. Hence the
equation will not hold for an n that is large enough.
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